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I. INTRODUCTION
The credit crisis highlights fundamental changes in financial
markets that have significant implications for financial industry risk
management and regulation. Contemporary financial markets are
increasingly characterized by pervasive trading by many market
participants.' Technological and financial innovations in recent years have
contributed to the development of pervasive trading cultures. For example,
trading in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and other innovative
financial products has fundamentally transformed financial markets. OTC
derivatives have also enabled greater connectivity and linkages among
financial market participants, sectors, and products.3  Technological
innovations have facilitated the development of pervasive global networks
in which financial market participants are linked through OTC derivatives
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1 See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Trading Places: Securities Regulation,
Market Crisis, and Network Risk (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Series, Paper No. 09-01, 2009) (manuscript on file with author), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1324951 # (follow
"Download" hyperlink; then select download location ).
2 OTC derivatives contracts, which include swaps and forwards, are traded through
customized and private contracts between parties that are typically based on
International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) form agreements. In
contrast, exchange-traded derivatives, which include futures and options on futures,
are traded on organized derivative exchanges (ODEs), such as the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, and are traded and cleared through standardized contracts
bought and sold in ODE markets. Id. at 24.
3 MOHAMED EL-ERIAN, WHEN MARKETS COLLIDE: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR
THE AGE OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHANGE 141 (2008) (noting that OTC derivatives
have "enabled to a far greater degree of linkage across markets than at any other
time.").
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contracts and other financial arrangements such as repurchase (repo)
agreements.4
The volume of OTC derivatives reflects their broader financial and
economic significance. In December 2008, an estimated $592 trillion in
notional value of OTC derivatives was outstanding, a decrease of 13.4%
from $683.7 trillion in June 2008. 5 Although the notional amount does not
reflect true risk exposure, it does represent one measure of market size that
is used as a reference point for determining contractual payments.6 The
gross market value of OTC derivatives, a better measure of risk, was $20.4
trillion in June 2008, close to one-third of global gross domestic product
(GDP) and larger than the GDP of any single country in the world.7
Despite the decline in notional values in December 2008, gross market
value of OTC derivatives increased by 66.5% to $33.9 trillion, which
constituted a significantly larger share of global GDP.
The confluence of technological innovation and OTC derivatives
has enabled the creation of vast global networks that have substantially
altered the sources and nature of financial market risk.9 Global financial
market networks have become increasingly complex, as multiple webs of
interconnections may link market participants through varied financial
market products. The complexity of financial market networks makes risk
management increasingly challenging.10 The unfolding of the credit crisis
that emerged in 2007 and 2008 illustrates the importance of risk
management as a key factor in the containment of the spread of financial
market crises. The credit market crisis also demonstrates how ineffective
4 Arewa, supra note 1, at 16-17.
5 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (BIS), OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN
THE FIRST HALF OF 2008 1 (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc-hy081l.pdf; BIS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET
ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2008 1 (May 2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc hy0905.pdf?noframes=l.
6 Id. at4.
7 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), WORLD FACTBOOK-EUROPEAN UNION
ECONOMY--OVERVIEW 2, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html
(estimating EU GDP as $14.66 trillion in 2007); Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: FOURTH QUARTER 2007
(FINAL) 8,T. 3, available at
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2008/pdf/gdp407f.pdf (reporting
U.S. GDP as an estimated $13.8 trillion in 2007).
8 BIS (May 2009), supra note 5, at 1; BIS (Nov. 2008), supra note 5, at 4.
9
.See generally Arewa, supra note 1.
10 COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK:
THE ROAD TO REFORM 4 (2008) (noting that due to structural, technological, and
behavioral reasons contemporary finance has become incredibly complex),
available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-ffl.pdf.
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financial market firewalls can lead to a network failure, evident in the
spread of cascading market crises through existing financial market
networks. 1 In this manner, financial contagion has spread to other market
participants, products, and activities, including the venture capital sector,
which some thought would have relative immunity to credit crisis financial
contagion. 12
II. THE CREDIT CRISIS AND NETWORK CONTAGION
A. The Credit Crisis and Risk: Origins and Impact
The credit market crisis that emerged in 2007 and 2008 reflects a
persistent mispricing of risk, particularly liquidity risk, with an initial focal
point in the subprime residential mortgage market segment. More
specifically, assumptions made about the presence of liquid markets for
complex derivative securities led many market participants to make
insufficient and even incorrect assumptions about the assets included on
their balance sheets. 13, Primary markets for subprime mortgages expanded
markedly in the early 2000s, facilitated by creative loans to a wide variety
of borrowers, including those with weaker credit. 14 Subprime mortgages
were packaged into a broad range of derivative securities, including
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and other Asset Backed Securities
(ABS), as well as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and Structured
Investment Vehicles (SIVs), which in some instances reflected a double
1 FED. RES. BANK OF NEW YORK, PAYMENT RISKS SUBCOMM, FED. FINANCIAL
MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE RISK 7 (May 2007) (describing systemic risk as risk
that comes about due to linkages in financial market infrastructures, and noting that
defaults in those infrastructures "can have a 'domino' effect on another network
resulting in a cascading series of defaults and failures, even across markets, regions
or globally.").
12 BRONwYN DYLLA BAILEY & AARON GERSHENBERG, SVB CAPITAL: VENTURE
CAPITAL UPDATE, VENTURE CAPITAL IN UNCERTAIN TIMES: OBSERVATIONS AND
PREDICTIONS 1 (Nov. 2008) available at
http://www.svb.com/pdfs/vc_2008_nov.pdf.
13 Confessions of a Risk Manager, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2008, at 72 ("Liquidity
risk was in effect not priced well enough; the market always allowed for it, but at
only very small margins prior to the credit crisis . . . The gap in our risk
management only opened up gradually over the years with the growth of traded
credit products such as CDO tranches and other asset-backed securities. These sat
uncomfortably between market and credit risk.").
14 Kristopher Gerardi, Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, Subprime Outcomes:
Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures 6 (Fed. Res.
Bank of Boston, Working Paper 07-15, Dec. 3, 2007).
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securitization process. 15 Primary markets for subprime mortgages and
residential mortgages more generally have been significantly influenced by
secondary market infrastructures that were created in order to facilitate
primary market residential housing finance. 16 Secondary market
infrastructures had a significant impact on primary market loan issuances
because they created liquid markets for securitized residential home
mortgages. This was particularly true in the early 2000s, when the ability
of lenders financing residential home purchases in primary markets to sell
the loans they originated in secondary markets contributed to a decline in
credit standards. 17 Subprime lenders thus financed their businesses through
secondary market sales. 18
During the early 2000s, mortgage loan origination and
securitization practices reflected widespread inattention to and even
mispricing of risk. 19 Risks in primary markets for loan origination spread
to other financial market segments and broader markets as a dense web of
financial market networks, involving a broad range of financial products,
including OTC derivatives. Many such derivative securities were priced
with insufficient attention to the implications of declines in residential
housing prices. 20 Further, CDOs that included exposure to home mortgage
assets incorporated assumptions about defaults and other variables that
were based on historical data.21 Price declines in residential housing
15 Richard J. Rosen, The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Lending, CHICAGO FED
LETTER No. 244 (Nov. 2007).16 Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil, Examining the Role of Securitization:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of Christopher L. Peterson, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Florida).
17 Andreas A. Jobst, Unscathed Securitization: Emerging Market CDOs After the
US Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis, GLOBAL SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED FIN.
8, 9 (2008).
18 Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14398, Oct. 2008), at 7, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id= 1276047 (noting that subprime
originators financed their business through securitization was the main finance
mechanism for subprime originators).
19 Jobst, supra note 17, at 9.
20 Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO.COM 5, Nov. 11, 2008,
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/l 1/1 1/The-
End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom/index4.html (noting that an S&P representative
disclosed that its models for home prices did not have the ability to accept a
negative number to reflect declining home prices).2 1COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP Ill, supra note 10, at 53
(noting that the characteristics and risk of loss associated with CDOs and other
structured products "were not fully understood by many market participants,"
which reflected varied factors, "including a lack of understanding of the inherent
limitations of valuation models and the risks of short-run historical data sets").
2010] Financial Firewalls: 309
The Credit Crisis and Network Contagion
markets led to an increase in mortgage defaults.2 z The increase in
mortgage default rates led to serious valuation problems for derivative
securities held on many balance sheets that had exposure to residential real
estate assets.23 The complex and networked relationships binding
participants in subprime and other market sectors contributed to the credit
crisis, because the nature of risks were not transparent, leading to a liquidity
crisis when participants began to hoard cash because of uncertainties about
the liquidity of other market participants. 24 Problems quickly spread to
institutions involved in residential housing finance secondary markets,
including Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which pool mortgages and
21guarantee against credit risk in the securitization process. In addition, a
broad range of financial institutions, like Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch
and Citibank, held CDOs and other financial instruments that had exposure
to residential housing markets on their balance sheets. 26 The complexity of
at least some of the derivative instruments held by such financial
institutions contributed to the collapse of liquidity in markets for complex
derivative securities. 27 Further, the presence of such "toxic" assets on
financial institution balance sheets contributed to the failure, forced sale,
and continuing financial malaise at a wide range of entities throughout the
world 28
B. Financial Contagion: Network Effects and CDS Markets
The spread of credit crisis contagion has not always been entirely
predictable, in part due to incomplete understanding of market participants
22 Dana Heller, Understanding the Economic Complexities of Loan Modification
Programs, at 1, Feb. 25, 2009, NERA Economic Consulting,
http://www.nera.com/image/PUB LoanModificationProgram_0209.pdf ("The
statistics on foreclosures and the effects of the decline in housing prices on the
equity of those homeowners are staggering. The rapid depreciation in housing
prices has already left millions of homeowners with negative equity on their
houses.").
23 Felix Salmon, Explaining CDOs, Overcollateralization Edition, PORTFOLIO.COM,
Dec. 28, 2007, http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-
movers/2007/12/28/explaining-cdos-overcollateralization-edition/ (noting the
impact of higher default rates in underlying mortgages for payouts to CDO
investors).
24 Gorton, supra note 18, at 1.
25 OFFICE OF FED. HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT (OFHEO), SYSTEMIC RISK:
FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC AND THE ROLE OF OFHEO 45, (Feb. 2003) (describing
the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac business models); Bethany McLean, Fannie
Mae's Last Stand, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2009.
26 John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect, NEW YORKER, March 31, 2008, at 78.
27 COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP III, supra note 10, at 53.
28 Gorton, supra note 18, at 1-2, 20-27.
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and regulators about the composition of financial market networks. For
example, Credit Default Swaps (CDS) have been important constituent
elements in the pervasive financial networks through which credit crisis
financial contagion has spread.29 CDS are nontransparent and largely
unregulated OTC derivatives contracts in which one party (the protection
seller) guarantees payment of a fixed-income security to another party (the
protection buyer). In exchange, the protection buyer pays the protection
seller a payment (usually on a quarterly or semiannual basis). 3' The
notional and market value of CDS contracts expanded astronomically in the
ten years preceding the credit crisis, with notional values rising from $180
million in 1997 to $57 trillion in notional value ($3 trillion in market value)
in June 2008, with a decline in notional value in December 2008 to $41.9
trillion in notional value; although notional values decreased, market values
increased significantly in December 2008 by 78.2% to $5.7 trillion. 32
CDS exposure reveals the pervasive mispricing of risk that existed
in multiple market arenas before the credit crisis. Further, CDS contracts
written on CDOs exposed protection sellers to residential housing markets.
The expansive growth in CDS contracts reflected speculative risk-taking on
both sides of CDS transactions. Protection buyers were not required to own
or purchase the underlying financial instrument being insured by the
protection seller. As a result, CDS transactions became a cheap and easy
vehicle for speculating on the health of a broad range of companies.
Protection sellers, who included traditional bond insurers as well as
insurance companies such as American International Group, Inc. (AIG),
began to issue insurance for increasing numbers of CDOs, which
represented an expansion outside of traditional bond insurance arenas in the
less risky world of municipal bonds. 3 Protection sellers did not correctly
calculate the risk of their guarantees, which led to significant problems for
the monoline bond insurers, as well as AIG. 35 AIG was a leading force in
CDS protection selling, largely through its subsidiaries, particularly AIG
29 Laurence K. Eisenberg & Thomas H. Noe, Systemic Risk in Financial Networks
l(Working Paper, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=- 173249 (noting that
financial markets reflect a "rich network of interconnections among firms.").
30 Arvind Rajan, A Primer on Credit Default Swaps, THE STRUCTURED CREDIT
HANDBOOK 17 (Arvind Rajan, Glen McDermott & Ratul Roy eds. 2007) (noting
that tight corporate yields stimulated investor demand for tranched structured
finance products).
31 id.
32 BIS (Nov. 2008), supra note 5, at 1; BIS (May 2009), supra note 5, at 2.
33 Giving Credit Where It is Due, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 2008 ("CDS contracts were
worth $62 trillion at the peak, far more than the bonds the CDSs were insuring.").
34 James Surowiecki, Bonds Unbound, NEW YORKER, Feb. 11, 2008, at 56.
35 Id. (discussing implosion of the monolines); Bond Insurers are Facing
Downgrades, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at 5.
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Financial Products (AIGFP).36 Miscalculations and the elimination of risk
controls led to a mispricing of risk by AIG in CDS protection contracts,
which contributed to AIG's need for a bailout from the federal
government. 
37
A general inattention to risk thus led to significant failures in
primary markets for residential housing finance, as well as a broad range of
secondary markets in which participants and financial products had
exposure to the residential housing primary markets. Troubles in these
markets soon spread through financial market linkages to participants
linked both directly and indirectly through financial market networks. For
example, problems with bond insurers have had significant network effects
that have infected markets for student loans and municipal bonds. 38
The risk-related problems emerging from CDS transactions are
magnified by their lack of transparency, which has contributed to systemic
risk. 39  The impact of cascading network failure in different financial
market arenas has also been exacerbated by the lack of effective firewalls
that might contain instability. A wide range of market participants did not
internalize the risk of their activities. Many also failed to maintain at
sufficient levels capital cushions that might serve as a firewall during
periods of market instability. 40 Thus, the credit crisis has had a significant
36 Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 2008, at A01 (describing CDS activities at AIGFP).
37 Liam Pleven, Sudeep Reddy & Carrick Mollenkamp, AIG Bailout Hit by New
Cash Woes, WALL ST. J., Oct 9, 2008 (noting AIG problems with securities lending
and credit default swaps); Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 3-7, (2008) (statement of Maurice Greenberg), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081007101332.pdf (attributing AIG's
need for a bailout to weakening or elimination of risk controls at AIGFP).38The State of the Bond Insurance Industry Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, at 2, Feb. 14, 2008, Serial No. 110-91 (remarks of Chairman Kanjorski)
(noting that bond insurer downgrades have led to limited availability of bond
insurance, which has caused significant problems in student loan financing and
municipal bond arenas, leading to some municipalities paying interest rates of more
than 10% on outstanding short-term debts); Sylvan G Feldstein, Frank J. Fabozzi &
Patrick M. Kennedy, THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 197, 216-218
(Frank J. Fabozzi ed. 2001) (noting the importance of insurance in municipal bond
context in reducing investor credit risk and expanding marketability of certain
municipal bonds).
39 John J. Schneider & Daniel S. Bender, The Impact of Regulation on Credit
Default Swaps 2 (2008), Navigant Consulting (noting that the inability of
regulators and the financial system to monitor CDS exposure has contributed to the
systemic impact of the CDS market).
40 Alan Greenspan, Banks Need More Capital, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2008, at 122
(noting that in the aftermath of the credit crisis, investors will require banks and
other intermediaries to have more capital).
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and widening impact on a broad range of market participants, segments,
and products.
C. Network Regulation: Markets, Products, and Players
The credit market crisis highlights failures in both industry risk
management and financial market regulatory oversight. A continuing
inability to recognize the importance of and appropriately regulate risk in
pervasive trading networks is a common element of both industry and
regulatory failures. 41 Financial market regulatory frameworks in the U.S.
reflect an inconsistent patchwork of largely reactionary regulation pieced
together over time.4 2 These frameworks reflect industry structures of the
past in which banking, securities, and insurance sectors were discrete
market segments regulated by separate regulators. Although the separation
among these sectors in the U.S. reflected regulatory requirements of Glass-
Steagall, 43 which limited the ability of banks to own securities and
insurance businesses, the elimination of Glass-Steagall restrictions in 1999
merely recognized the global business reality of convergence among
financial market sectors. 44 Prior to the credit market crisis, U.S. regulatory
frameworks formed a complex fabric of overlapping regulations by largely
functional regulators. These regulatory frameworks continue to track
categories of financial market business sectors that have long since ceased
to exist in their original forms.45
41 See generally Arewa, supra note 1.
42 Press Release, Dept. Treas., Under Secretary Steel Remarks on U.S. Financial
Regulation, (Feb. 7, 2008) (describing U.S. regulatory frameworks as "largely knit
together over the last 75 years - with act on top of act, initiative on top of initiative
- each a reaction to various crises or innovations in the financial services
industry").
43 THE DEP'T OF THE TREAS., BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE, at 34, March 2008 (noting that four sections of the
Banking Act of 1933, which was known as the Glass-Steagall Act, "mandated strict
separation of commercial and investment banking"); James R. Barth, R. Dan
Brumbaugh Jr. & James A. Wilcox, The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of
Broad Banking, (U.S. Treasury Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper No.
2000-5) (noting that Glass-Steagall had prohibited bank holding companies from
offering investment, commercial banking and insurance services).
44 Loretta J. Mester, Repealing Glass-Steagall: The Past Points the Way to the
Future, Phil Bus. Rev. (July-Aug. 1996).
45 Steel, supra note 42 ("Today we have a series of individual regulations, each
designed in response to specific circumstances and lacking an overarching set of
guiding principles. Our system has multiple federal and state regulators with
unclear and sometimes overlapping boundaries.").
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The complexity and fragmentation of U.S. regulatory frameworks
compromised their ability to confront questions of systemic risk, 46 which
includes risks to financial market networks and the broader financial
system.47  Furthermore, fragmented regulatory frameworks were not
equipped to regulate the pervasive financial market networks that have been
facilitated in recent years by financial and technological innovations,
48particularly in the OTC derivatives arena. The exemption of most OTC
derivatives from regulation under the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000 (CFMA) exacerbated the patchwork nature of regulatory
coverage and contributed to a general lack of transparency in financial
market networks. 49 This lack of transparency magnified the impact of the
credit crisis because little understanding existed concerning the composition
or structure of financial market networks.
Exemption of OTC derivatives from regulation under the CFMA
was based on assumptions about the nature of sophisticated parties entering
into OTC derivatives transactions. A 1999 President's Working Group
(PWG) report made an influential case for non-regulation of OTC
derivatives. The report specifically recommended that transactions
involving sophisticated counterparties, including eligible swap participants
that are otherwise subject to regulation, be excluded from regulation under
the Commodity Exchange Act. 50  The 1999 PWG report reflects a
fundamental distinction evident in federal regulatory frameworks, including
securities and futures regulation, between public and private entities and
market activities. Activities and entities that fall within the "public" sphere
are generally subject to greater regulation, while those that fall within the
"private" arena are typically subject to fewer regulatory registration and
46 Joel Seligman, The United States Federal-State Model of Securities Regulation,
at 78, 84, Sept. 4, 2003, Research Study Prepared for the Wise Persons'
Committee, Government of Canada, available at
http://www.wiseaverties.ca/reports/WPC3.pdf (describing US securities
regulatory frameworks as Byzantine, and noting that regulators see advantages to
having more regulators involved).
47 Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 11, at 7 (describing systemic risk as risk that
comes about due to linkages in financial market infrastructures and that default in
one such infrastructure "can have a 'domino' effect on another network resulting in
a cascading series of defaults and failures, even across markets, regions or
globally.").
48 id.
41 P.L.106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (amending Commodity Exchange Act 7
U.S.C §§ 1 et seq. (2006)).
50 Presidents Working Group, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND
THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, at 2-3, Nov. 1999; Commodity Exchange Act 7
U.S.C §§ 1 et seq. (2006).
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disclosure requirements, although activities in the "private" arena generally
remain subject to anti-fraud liability.
The relatively light regulation of activities and entities that fall
within the "private" segment is typically based on assumptions about the
nature of participants in such market sectors, and the ability of such
participants to protect themselves without the need for the protection of
regulation."' However, this conception of regulation assumes that
transactions in such markets are discrete, with a primary impact on
participants in such transactions themselves and takes insufficient account
of the potential impact of such activities on broader financial market
networks, particularly in instances where market participants may not
adequately internalize the risk of their activities. Despite regulation of
entities that might engage in transactions involving significant risk, current
regulatory frameworks do not sufficiently consider the reality of pervasive
financial market networks that intersect and link the "public" and "private"
market segments. Further, existing frameworks do not sufficiently take
account of the systemic risk that may be engendered by activities within
such networks. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation of
investment bank holding companies under its now terminated Consolidated
Supervised Entity (CSE) program reflected significant inattention to issues
of risk in CSE participating entities,52 many of which became focal points
in the creation and spread of financial market contagion. 53 Pre-credit crisis
financial market regulation frameworks focused far too much on regulating
entities and far too little on focusing on network effects. This lack of
regulatory and industry attention to network effects is a key factor in the
development and spread of the credit crisis.
The activities of venture capitalists (VCs) played little or no role in
the development of the credit crisis. Venture capital typically functions in
market sectors that are lightly regulated and, in many respects, represents a
model for private market ordering that appropriately aligns incentives
largely in the absence of external regulation.54 Despite a lack of direct
51 SEC v. Ralston-Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (establishing that the main
consideration in determining availability of Section 4(2) private offering exemption
is whether offerees are able to fend for themselves without need of the protection
afforded by the Securities Act).
52 SEC, Office of Inspector General, SEC's Oversight of Bear Steams and Related
Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program 7, Sept. 25, 2008, Report
No. 446-A.
53 Arewa, supra note 1, at 68-71.
54 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1067, 1069 (2003) (describing private
ordering as the keystone of the U.S. venture industry and describing private
ordering as "the contracting structure that developed to manage the extreme
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involvement in the activities that precipitated the credit crisis, venture
capital is nonetheless experiencing a significant impact in the aftermath of
the credit crisis. The impact of the credit market crisis in the venture
capital arena illustrates the spread of financial contagion through financial
market networks. The spread of contagion through network connectivity
underscores the need for regulatory frameworks and industry risk
management in the future that focus on mechanisms that create firewalls to
contain the spread of contagion within entities responsible for creating risks
that precipitated the financial crisis. "
III. THE CREDIT CRISIS AND VENTURE CAPITAL
A. The Venture Capital Sector
The impact of the credit crisis in the venture capital sector is
noteworthy and reveals ways the credit crisis market contagion has spread
through financial market networks to infect other market segments.
Venture capital represents one segment of the private equity investment
arena and has traditionally been a significant source of financing for
entrepreneurial companies, which form an important sector in the broader
U.S. economy. Venture capital investors typically invest in early stage
companies with little or no revenues that are not yet profitable. 56 Venture
capital investing involves significant risk, which leads venture capitalists to
require a higher rate of return than other private equity investors.57
Venture investors, who may include wealthy private investors,
often referred to as "angel investors," or institutional investors, typically
own less than 50% of their portfolio companies.58 Venture capitalists may
work with founders or existing company management in developing
strategies to commercialize a company's products and grow revenues to
profitability. Although venture capital investors do not typically seek
active control of companies, they typically retain significant control
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that inevitably bedevil early-
stage, high-technology financing").
55 Arewa, supra note 1, at 71-75.
56 John C. Mcllwraith, The Outlook for the Private Equity Market, 51 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 423,424 (2001).
57 Id. at 425 ("Venture investors generally seek a higher rate of return on their
investments than do LBO investors-a five to ten times return on their investment
versus a three to five times return. This difference reflects the much higher degree
of risk involved in a venture investment.").58 Id. at 424.
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mechanisms and may assert control when companies fail to meet
performance objectives. '9
The entrepreneurship fostered by venture capital is an important
determinant in savings, investment and wealth inequality. 60 The influence
of the venture capital sector thus extends far beyond companies that receive
venture capital financing. Small businesses play a critical role in the U.S.
economy, representing a significant and increasing proportion of U.S.
economic activity, and account for approximately half of U.S. output and
private sector employment. 61 Venture-backed companies, which are a
small but influential portion of small businesses, are "among the crown
jewels of the American economy. 62  Such companies are important
economically, both on account on their involvement with cutting-edge
scientific and technological innovation, as well as their status as "important
engine[s] of macroeconomic growth and job creation." 63 The development
of such companies and commercialization of their technology is heavily
dependent on access to capital, particularly in the earlier stages of such
companies' development, including seed and start-up phases. 64 In these
early stages of development, private investors are often a major source of
funding. 
65
The network effects of the credit market crisis have contributed to
malaise in the venture capital and private equity arena more generally. The
spread of credit market crisis contagion in the venture sector may limit
access capital in important ways that may have broader effects within
industry segments and geographic areas with strong connections to venture
capital investment processes. In the venture capital arena, two primary
network effects are evident. The first major impact of the credit crisis led
to venture capitalists' having a reduced ability to exit their existing
investments. The second network effect occurred on the investor side as a
result of the stress that the credit crisis has placed on institutional investors,
59/d. at 424-425.
60 Marco Cagetti & Mariacristina De Nardi, Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and
Wealth, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, Res. Dept. Staff Rep. 340, July 2004, at 1,
available at www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/SR340.pdf.
61 OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS
ECONOMY: A REPORT To THE PRESIDENT 5 (2004), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbecon2004.pdf.
62 Gilson, supra note 544, at 1068.
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Developments, 6 J. PRiv. EQUITY 16 (2003); William Aspray & J. McGrath
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such as university endowments and pension funds that are significant
investors in the venture capital arena.
B. Exit Opportunities Foreclosed.- IPO and M&A Markets in the
Credit Crisis
Although venture capitalists largely make investments in private
companies that are not subject to federal regulatory registration or
disclosure requirements, public markets have a significant impact on
venture capital in a number of important ways. Well functioning capital
markets are a critical aspect of venture capital investment strategies because
66vetr
such markets provide VCs with exit opportunities. Although venture
capital is a small segment of U.S. capital markets, its impact on capital
markets is significant: in the eleven years ending in 1988, 30% of U.S.
initial public offerings (IPOs) had venture backing. 67 This percentage has
likely increased since 1988.68 Typical VC exit avenues are initial public
offerings (IPOs), private sales, or management buyout transactions.6 9
The credit market crisis negatively affected venture capital fund
exit opportunities. 70 Broader market instability during the credit crisis led
to a difficult environment for companies seeking to go public, and activity
in global IPO markets was virtually frozen by the end of 2008. During the
third quarter of 2008, for example, a total of five companies went public in
the U.S. in transactions totaling $935 million, a decrease from thirty-nine
companies and $12 billion in the same quarter in 2007.7 Decreased IPO
activity in the U.S. paralleled declines in other markets. 72 The freezing of
66 RICHARD L. SMITH & JANET KILHOLM SMITH, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 605
(2d ed. 2000).67 Id. at 470.68 Id. at 471.
69 Id. at 497 (noting that venture investors harvest their investments in three
principal ways: IPOs, private sales, and management buyouts); Phillip D. Torrence
& Richard A. Walawender, Legal Considerations in Exit Strategies: IPO vs. Sale,
PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 357 (Harry
Cendrowski et al. eds. 2008) (describing private equity fund exit strategies as
including sale of portfolio companies in an initial public offering or sale of the
company's stock or assets to another).
70 Claire Cain Miller, Venture Capital Exit Drought Continues, N.Y. TIMES Bits
Blog, Oct. 1, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/venture-capital-exit-
drought-continues/.
71 Lynn Cowan, Pace of IPOs Globally Continues to Slow in Uncertain Climate,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2008, at C10.
72 Id. (noting that Europe experienced a 78 percent decline in IPO issuers and 94
percent decline in IPO proceeds, China encountered a 62 percent decline in IPO
issuers and 80 percent decline in IPO proceeds, and India also suffered similar
declines, as did Latin America, where no IPOs came to market in the third quarter
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global IPO markets was felt in the venture sector, where only seven
venture-backed companies went public in the first three quarters of 2008 as
compared with forty-eight companies in 2007.73 Merger and acquisition
(M&A) activity similarly declined in 2008, with transactions involving
venture-backed companies declining from $34.1 billion to $22.3 billion in
the first three quarters of 2008 as compared with 2007 and declining from
$12.7 billion to $4.4 billion in the third quarters of 2008 and 2007.7
The network effects of the credit crisis that led to a freezing of IPO
and M&A transactions have thus limited the ability of VCs to exit their
investments. The inability of VCs to exit existing investments has placed
pressure on both VCs and venture-backed companies. As a result, VCs may
not be able to contribute to existing portfolio companies or make
investments in new portfolio companies, which may lead to failures at a
broad range of venture-backed companies.
C. Venture Capital Limited Partners: Institutional Investors and
Liquidity Constraints
Network effects of the credit crisis in the venture capital arena
extend far beyond the ability of VCs to exit investments. Limited partner
investors in venture capital funds have also experienced a significant impact
from the credit crisis. The effects of the credit crisis for such investors have
of 2008 and that although IPO issuers decline in the Middle East and North Africa
during this same time period, IPO proceeds doubled in that region to $1.5 billion).
73 Dow Jones Venture Wire, Crisis Crushing Venture-backed IPO and M&A
Activity, Oct. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.researchrecap.com/index.php/2008/10/01/crisis-crushing-venture-
backed-ipo-and-ma-activity/ ("Only seven venture-backed companies have gone
public so far this year, compared with 48 in the first three quarters of 2007.").
74 Id.
75 Henry Blodget, Dear Investors and Portfolio Companies: We're Broke, SILICON
ALLEY INSIDER, Nov. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/1 1/dear-investors-and-portfolio-companies-
we-have-no-cash; Eric Eldon, More Details On Sequoia's Economic "Inconvenient
Truth " Meeting, VentureBeat.com, Oct. 9, 2008,
http://venturebeat.com/2008/10/09/more-details-on-sequoias-economic-
inconvenient-truth-meeting/ (describing a meeting held in October 2008 by
premiere VC firm Sequoia in which Sequoia reportedly told its portfolio "to cut
costs and prepare for an economic downturn that could last many years"); Ken
Schachter, Silicon Valley Goes Dry, RedHerring.com, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.redherring.com/home/25124 ("As with other segments of the economy,
the global credit crisis is casting a dark shadow over venture-backed companies.");
Julie Schmit, Biotech Firms Face Cash Shortage, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 2008, at
8A ("Almost 40% of small and midsize public biotechnology companies in the
U.S. are in danger of running out of cash within a year and government help is
needed to encourage investment, industry leaders say.").
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contributed difficulties for venture capital funds. Venture capital funds are
typically structured as limited partnerships in which investors participate as
limited partners (LPs).7 6 The venture capitalists or managers of the venture
capital fund are generally principals in a limited liability entity that serves
as the venture fund's general partner (GP). The GP has substantial control
over venture capital fund activities and makes and monitors fund
78investments. In the typical venture capital fund, limited partner investors
in the fund contractually agree to contribute a certain amount to the venture
fund (a "capital commitment"), but do not contribute the full amount at the
time they make this commitment. LPs are typically required to make
capital contributions to the fund whenever the GP issues a request for funds
(a "capital call"). LPs are required to forward the requested funds when the
GP makes a capital call. 7 Most private equity funds call 100 percent of
committed capital within the first three or four years. 
80
The credit market crisis has entailed freezing of credit markets that
has created significant liquidity problems for the institutional investors that
are an important segment of venture capital fund investors. 81  The
circumstances confronting university endowments during the credit crisis
illustrate the types of liquidity constraints that potential venture fund LPs
have faced. In recent years, university endowments have posted superior
returns on their investments. 82 These returns have been largely due to
investment strategies by university endowments that have allocated
significant funds to the alternative investment arena, including private
equity, venture capital funds, hedge funds, and other types of commonly
illiquid investments. 83 University endowments play an important role in
76 Harry Cendrowski et al., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND
OPERATIONS 3, 5- 6 (Harry Cendrowski et al. eds. 2008).
77 id.
78 Gilson, supra note 5462, at 1088 (noting that venture capital limited partnerships
are virtually completely controlled by GPs).
79 Cendrowski, supra note 76, at 6 (noting that LPs must adhere to GP capital
calls).80 Id. at 24.
81 Michael M. Grynbaum, Signs Thawing Begins In Credit Flow; DOW Rises by
413, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/21/business/21 markets.html?_r= 1 &ref--todayspa
per ("Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September, the credit markets
entered a state of near paralysis, keeping many businesses and municipalities from
obtaining financing.").
82 Josh Lemer, Antoinette Schoar & Wan Wonsunwai, Smart Institutions, Foolish
Choices? The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle, 62 J. FIN. 731, 733 (2007)
("The average returns of private equity funds that endowments invest in are nearly
21% greater than those of the average LP in our sample.").
83 Josh Lemer, Antoinette Schoar & Jialan Wang, Secrets of the Academy: The
Drivers of University Endowment Success, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 207, 214
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university operations, and many universities "rely heavily on income from
their endowments." 8 4  Network effects of the credit crisis that froze
liquidity for a wide range of market participants, combined with investment
decisions by university endowments, have contributed to significant
liquidity constraints on university endowments, which have contributed to
financial distress at universities. 85
During the initial stages of the credit crisis, a number of
endowments had a shortage of cash, which led university endowments to
attempt to sell private equity investments on the secondary market at what
is thought to be a discount of at least 50 percent. 86 Universities have also
been forced to make significant budget cuts in anticipation of declining
payouts from endowments that have suffered significant declines in the
values of their investment holdings. 87 Some university endowments also
entered into transactions such as credit default swaps that magnified their
exposure to markets and added to investment losses. 88  The problems
(2008) (noting a shift by university endowments away from equities and fixed
income investments toward sophisticated and often illiquid alternative assets);
Ivory-Towering Infernos, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2008, at 88, available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfin?storyid= 12778077 (noting
that Yale had a target of 2006 for investing 69 percent of its endowment in illiquid
alternative asset classes such as hedge funds, private equity, property, and forests).
84 Lemer, Schoar & Wang, supra note 83, at 207.
85 John Hechinger & Craig Karmin, Harvard Hit by Loss as Crisis Spreads to
Colleges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122832139322576023.html; Claire Cain Miller &
Geraldine Fabrikant, Beyond the Ivied Halls, Endowments Suffer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/business/26endowment.html (discussing
university financial distress).
86 Jonathan Keehner & Jason Kelly, Harvard-Led Sale of Private-Equity Stakes
Hits Values, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aOzdopFBGnbY&refe
r=home (describing 50 percent discounts in secondary market sales of Harvard
private equity (LBO) investments); Felix Salmon, Endowments Dump Private
Equity Stakes, PORTFOLIO.COM, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/12/01/endowments-
dump-private-equity-stakes.
87 Ivory-Towering Infernos, supra note 83 (noting that Stanford senior executives
have taken 10% pay cuts); Miller & Fabrikant, supra note 85 (noting that university
endowments are trying to sell private equity stakes on the secondary market to raise
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experienced by venture capital fund LPs, such as university endowments,
have contributed to venture capital fund problems in the credit crisis. These
problems are both a consequence of broader market conditions and the
structure of LP investment in venture capital funds. In the initial stages of
the credit crisis, cash strapped investors refused to fund their capital
commitments to venture capital funds. 89 Such defaulting LPs left venture
capital funds with less cash than they had anticipated. 90 As a result, VCs
were not able to fund existing and new portfolio companies. 9
1
IV. CONCLUSION
The fallout from the credit crisis in the venture capital arena
highlights the depth and breadth of financial market networks. The spread
of the credit crisis underscores the need for risk management and regulation
that focuses on better containment of the spread of financial contagion. In
the venture sector, the combination of limited exit opportunities and limited
partner liquidity constraints will likely lead to changes in the composition
of market participants. 92  The credit crisis underscores the reality of
pervasive networks in financial markets. Such networks reveal that few
participants in financial markets are likely to be sheltered from the
consequences of network failure, particularly if firewalls are not adequate
in light of the risks taken on by financial market participants, both
individually and in aggregate.
89 Pui-Wing Tam & Craig Karmin, Venture Capital Hits a Cash-Call Crunch,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2008, at Cl, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122869480476586689.html.
90 Henry Blodget, More VC Investors Defaulting, Cash Crunch Getting Worse,
SILICON ALLEY INSIDER, Dec. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/12/more-vc-investors-defaulting-cash-
crunch-getting-worse.
9' Bailey & Gershenberg, supra note 122, at 2 (noting that VCs are now likely to
scrutinize portfolio companies to cull companies that are expected to succeed to
"focus scarce resources on their highest impact companies").
92 Id. at 4-5 (projecting that the venture industry will have fewer and more diverse
investment funds).
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